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—  Note  — 
The Third Amendment 
Incorporated: “Soldiers” and 
Domestic Law Enforcement 
“No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, 
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a 
manner to be prescribed by law.” 1 
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Introduction 
In 2013, the Mitchell family sued the City of Henderson for viola-
ting their Third Amendment rights.2 According to the complaint, se-
veral police officers forcibly removed Anthony Mitchell and his parents, 
Linda and Michael, from their respective homes3 and remained in them 
for several hours.4 The police initially asked for the family’s cooperation 
in investigating a domestic violence dispute involving one of their next-
door neighbors.5 Evidently, the nature of the dispute required SWAT 
team assistance.6 
When Anthony declined to assist the police, he was forcibly re-
moved from his home and arrested.7 The officers remained in his home 
to carry out their surveillance on Anthony’s neighbor as planned.8 After 
a bizarre turn of events, the officers subsequently arrested Michael and 
forcibly removed Linda from their home, presumably also for 
surveillance.9 The officers searched the family house and the cars, 
spilled condiments from the refrigerator onto the floor, and drank from 
the Mitchells’ cooler, evidenced by fifteen empty plastic cups found in 
the trashcan.10 The Mitchell family sued, claiming the officers 
“quartered themselves in [their home] without their consent, violating 
their rights guaranteed by the Third and Fourteenth Amendments of 
the United States Constitution.”11 While the district court allowed some 
of the family’s other claims to proceed on the merits, the court 
dismissed the family’s Third Amendment claim, holding that municipal 
police officers are not “soldiers” within the meaning of the Third 
Amendment.12 
 
2. First Amended Complaint at 29, Mitchell v. City of Henderson, No. 2:13-
cv-01154, (D. Nev. Feb. 2, 2015). 
3. Anthony Mitchell and his parents own separate homes on the same street. 
Id. at 6. 
4. Id. at 36. 
5. Mitchell v. City of Henderson, No. 2:13-cv-01154, 2015 WL 427835, at *1 
(D. Nev. Feb. 2, 2015).  
6. Id. 
7. Id. at *2–4. 
8. Id. at *3. 
9. Id.  
10. Id. 
11. First Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 29. 
12. Mitchell, 2015 WL 427835, at *18. 
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Of all the provisions contained in the Bill of Rights, the Third 
Amendment is the least litigated.13 The contours of Third Amendment’s 
protections are undefined and untested. The first, and only, Third 
Amendment case to be tried on the merits was in 1981.14 Since then, 
only a handful of courts have even considered Third Amendment claims 
before dismissing the challenges. Significantly, because the Amendment 
has never been the subject of a U.S. Supreme Court challenge, it has 
not been incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause.15 
Unfortunately, the case law, as well as most academic literature on 
the Third Amendment, is without a comprehensive incorporation 
analysis. As the recent Second Amendment jurisprudence suggests, this 
is a missed opportunity. That is, District of Columbia v. Heller16 and 
McDonald v. City of Chicago17 illustrate how the incorporation question 
involves an analytical framework quite distinct from the framework 
required to ascertain original meaning. These cases also show how the 
Supreme Court reinterpreted the Second Amendment, finding that the 
Amendment’s original militia-focused purpose was no longer a 
limitation to the Amendment’s reach.  
If the Supreme Court ever considers whether the Third Amendment 
binds state and local law enforcement, the Court would likely model 
the analysis on Heller and McDonald. For protections yet to be 
authoritatively interpreted by the Supreme Court, like the Third 
Amendment, the Court will have to undergo two layers of analysis—
one to determine original meaning, the other to determine whether the 
right applies against state and local governments.  
First we ask what a constitutional amendment means based on the 
text, original understanding, and legislative history leading up to 
ratification in 1789. In this Note, step one will be analyzed through an 
originalist lens,18 given that method of interpretation’s general accep-
tance by today’s Court.19 Thus, we ask how the Framers’ generation 
 
13. Tom W. Bell, Note, The Third Amendment: Forgotten but Not Gone, 2 
Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 117, 140 (1993). 
14. Engblom v. Carey, 522 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
15. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765 n.13 (2010); but see Engblom 
v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 961 (2d Cir. 1982) (affirming the district court’s 
holding that the Third Amendment applies against state governments). 
16. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
17. 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
18. In this Note, I do not intend to consider the various strands of originalism. 
Rather, I analyze the Third Amendment’s meaning, as of 1789, using the 
originalist model Justice Scalia employed in District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
19. See Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 Geo. L.J. 657, 659 (2009) 
(noting that in Heller, “[n]ot only did Justice Scalia secure five votes for 
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“would have expected the relevant constitutional principles to be ar-
ticulated and applied,”20 eschewing any consideration of “current 
societal values” in favor of an original, “fixed meaning.”21 
Given the interpretation in step one, step two determines whether 
the right applies to state and local governments—that is, whether the 
right is “fundamental” and thus applies against the states, through the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Here, the step two 
analysis is even more malleable than that of step one, and hence, lends 
itself to alternative interpretations. This is because the analysis calls 
for two lines of inquiry which can, in theory, lead to different outcomes. 
On the one hand, we widen the inquiry by asking whether the right is 
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”22 Here, the Court 
looks to the depths of American history, as well of English common-law 
history, up until 1868, the year the Fourteenth Amendment was 
ratified. At the same time, we are asking a more specific question—
whether the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended for the 
right in question to be incorporated against the states. As will be 
demonstrated, this inquiry—versus the originalist inquiry tethered to 
the time of the Bill of Rights’s ratification (step one)—can alter the 
application, and even the character, of a Bill of Rights protection. 
This observation bodes well for the question of the Third Amend-
ment’s present-day reach. As will be discussed in this Note, an origin-
alist analysis of the term “soldier,” as used in the Third Amendment, 
is unlikely to be interpreted by a court as applying, or being intended 
to apply, to municipal police. That is, “soldier” was most certainly 
understood by the Framers of the Constitution as applying to a narrow 
class of federal governmental actors.23 Incorporation doctrine, however, 
allows for a second round of analysis in deriving meaning from a Bill of 
Rights guarantee, which takes into account American attitudes and 
understandings during the eighteenth century. 
In this Note I argue that future Third Amendment litigants should 
utilize incorporation analysis to tie “soldiers” to municipal police. That 
is, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, given certain historical 
developments during the nineteenth century, would have understood 
 
the most thoroughgoing originalist opinion in the Court’s history, but 
Justice Stevens’s dissent appeared to engage rather than challenge the 
majority’s originalist premises”). 
20. See Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism 7 (2011) (referring to Scalia’s 
method of originalist interpretation as an “original expected application,” 
which “asks how people living at the time the text was adopted would have 
expected it would be applied using language in its ordinary sense”). 
21. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 854 
(1989). 
22. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 
702, 721 (1997)). 
23. See infra Part III.C. 
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“soldier” as encompassing local, modern-day state actors including 
police officers and certainly police paramilitary units like SWAT. I 
arrive at this conclusion by considering what governmental actors were 
considered “soldiers” at the time of the Constitution’s ratification, and 
then considering what functions those “soldiers” served during the 
course of the nineteenth century until Reconstruction. I then analyze 
the status of local law enforcement in the mid-nineteenth century and 
how it compares to local law enforcement today. The answers to these 
questions suggest that an incorporated Third Amendment ought to 
bind state and municipal law enforcement.  
Part I of this Note will discuss what we know about the Third 
Amendment today, given the sparse case law and scholarly commen-
tary. Part II will illustrate the mechanics required to interpret a Bill of 
Rights protection and the differences inherent in incorporation analysis. 
As a guide, I will look to the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on 
the Second Amendment. Part III will analyze what the Third 
Amendment means based on the Framers’ intent. In Part IV, I will 
consider the Third Amendment through incorporation analysis. I 
conclude that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment would have 
contemplated today’s police to fall within the Third Amendment’s 
grasp. Finally, I end by commenting on implications inherent in 
applying the Third Amendment to state and local law enforcement. 
I. What We Know About the Third Amendment 
The Third Amendment is the least litigated of the Bill of Rights 
Amendments.24 Most of the Third Amendment’s treatment by federal 
courts has consisted of symbolic interpretations contained in dicta. 
Similarly, the legal scholarship exploring the Third Amendment is 
wanting. As I argue in this Note, the dearth of scholarly attention paid 
to the relationship between incorporation and the Third Amendment 
represents a significant oversight. 
A. The Courts 
The little attention the Third Amendment has received by the ju-
diciary reveals two distinct treatments of the right. On the one hand, 
some courts have briefly considered specific Third Amendment claims 
before promptly dismissing them, with only one notable exception.25 On 
the other hand, courts have invoked the Third Amendment as support 
for the proposition that the concepts of property and privacy interests 
are embedded in the Constitution. 
 
24. Bell, supra note 13, at 140. 
25. See infra Part I.A.1. 
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The latter approach—the symbolic application—has been invoked 
sua sponte by the U.S. Supreme Court on a few limited occasions. For 
example, in the context of a landlord-tenant dispute involving civilian 
parties, the U.S. Supreme Court invoked the Third Amendment in 
1921.26 The Court noted that the Third Amendment was added to the 
Constitution “in recognition of the purpose to protect property and the 
rights of its owner from governmental aggression.”27 
Forty years later, the U.S. Supreme Court twice invoked the Third 
Amendment, in the context of contraception, as a symbol of the 
Founding Fathers’ commitment to privacy. In Poe v. Ullman,28 for 
example, Justice Harlan dissented, interpreting the Third Amendment, 
in light of the Fourth Amendment, as embracing “the concept of the 
privacy of the home.”29 Subsequently, Justice Douglas reiterated the 
Court’s position in Griswold v. Connecticut30 where he said that the 
Third, along with the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments, created 
a “zone of privacy.”31 Some recent courts have echoed this sentiment.32 
Conversely, courts that have considered literal Third Amendment 
claims have interpreted the Amendment narrowly. In Custer County 
Action Ass’n v. Garvey,33 for example, the Tenth Circuit declined to 
apply the Third Amendment’s protections to Colorado homeowners 
seeking to have the airspace above their homes free from military 
aircraft travel.34 Similarly, in Jones v. U.S. Secretary of Defense,35 a 
federal court denied the plaintiff’s motion to enjoin, on Third Amend-
ment grounds, commanders of the United States Army from requiring 
army reservists to participate in a military parade.36 The first case to 
 
26. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921). 
27. Id. at 165. 
28. 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
29. Id. at 549 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
30. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
31. Id. at 484. 
32. See, e.g., United States v. Warras, No. 2:13-cr-439-LDG-VCF, 2015 WL 
6736981, at *6 (D. Nev. May 18, 2015) (noting that the Third, like the First 
and Fifth Amendments, protects the home, which “occupies a special place 
in the pantheon of constitutional rights” (quoting United States v. 
Craighead, 539 F.3d 1073, 1082 (9th Cir. 2008))). 
33. 256 F.3d 1024 (10th Cir. 2001). 
34. Id. at 1043. 
35. 346 F. Supp. 97, 98–100 (D. Minn. 1972). 
36. Id. at 98–100. 
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begin to identify the Third Amendment’s contours was Engblom v. 
Carey in 1981.37 
1. Engblom v. Carey 
The Engblom plaintiffs were corrections officers at a prison in New 
York.38 The plaintiffs rented, and used as their residences, on-site 
dormitory-style housing, made available by the prison for a monthly 
rate.39 One morning in 1979, most of the corrections officers at the 
prison skipped work in favor of partaking in a statewide union strike.40 
In response, the Governor called forth the New York National Guard 
to assist with peacekeeping at the prison.41 Over 200 National Guards-
man, with permission of the prison superintendent, occupied the 
plaintiff’s dormitories at the prison, staying there for ten days.42 
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim on the 
grounds that they lacked sufficient possessory interests in the dormi-
tories to render them a “house” within the meaning of the Third 
Amendment.43 Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the court, without 
getting into much detail,44 found that the Third Amendment was in-
corporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause.45 Further, the court held that National Guardsmen 
are “soldiers” within the meaning of the Third Amendment.46 The court 
reasoned that the National Guardsmen are the modern-day successors 
to the Militias reserved to the states through the Constitution,47 and 
 
37. See Engblom v. Carey, 522 F. Supp. 57, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (“From the time 
of [the Third Amendment’s] adoption until September 10, 1979, the date of 
the filing of this action, as far as can be determined, no citizen has found it 
necessary to invoke the Amendment to protect his dwelling from use by the 
military. In an extraordinary demonstration of the vitality and versatility of 
our Constitution, just such a claim is here made for the first time, albeit 
unsuccessfully.”). 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 62. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 63. 
43. Id. at 67–68. 
44. Id. at 65 (stating that “[h]ere it should not be necessary to wander too far 
into the thicket of incorporation jurisprudence”). 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 15, 16 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o 
provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress 
Insurrections and repel Invasions; To Provide for organizing, arming, and 
disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be 
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that National Guardsmen are employees of the state under control of 
the Governor, except when federalized by unit.48 
On appeal, the Second Circuit remanded the case for trial on the 
Third Amendment claim.49 The court agreed with the district court 
that the Third Amendment is incorporated against the states.50 Second, 
the court confirmed that National Guardsman are “soldiers” within the 
meaning of the Amendment and are state employees under the 
Governor’s direction.51 Third, the court reaffirmed that the Third 
Amendment was “designed to assure a fundamental right to privacy.”52 
In terms of the word “house,” the court rejected the “formalistic 
construction” employed by the district court.53 The court found that 
“house” is not limited to residences “arising out of fee simple ownership 
but extend to those recognized and permitted by society as founded on 
lawful occupation or possession with a legal right to exclude others.”54 
In short, by allowing the claim to proceed, the Second Circuit re-
cognized a contemporary application of the Third Amendment that, 
arguably, expanded the Amendment’s scope. Nonetheless, on remand 
the district court declined to hold the defendants liable for Third 
Amendment violations because, being state actors, they were protected 
by qualified immunity.55 Because the Third Amendment rights were not 
“clearly established” at the time of the encroachment, the government 
was shielded from liability.56 
2. Estate of Bennett and Mitchell 
Finally, there have been two federal cases within the last ten years 
in which litigants sought application of the Third Amendment to 
 
employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States 
respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training 
the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.”). 
48. Engblom, 522 F. Supp. at 65. 
49. Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 966 (2d Cir. 1982). 
50. Id. at 961. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 962. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Engblom v. Carey, 572 F. Supp. 44, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
56. Id. at 46 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (“We 
therefore hold that government officials performing discretionary functions, 
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct 
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.” (emphasis added))). 
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municipal law enforcement. In Estate of Bennett v. Wainwright,57 the 
dismissal was a foregone conclusion given what the judge described as 
“less than illuminating” allegations in the complaint.58 Nonetheless, 
regarding the plaintiff’s attempt to link the Third Amendment to 
municipal police, the judge made two legal findings about the defini-
tions of “soldiers” and “quartering.” Referring to the claim as a “far-
fetched, metaphorical” application, the court said that “[t]here is no 
sense in which a single state trooper and several deputy sheriffs can be 
considered ‘soldiers’ . . . nor in which the use of a house . . . for a period 
of fewer than 24 hours could be construed as ‘quartering.’”59 
The Mitchell court reached the same conclusion. As mentioned in 
the Introduction, the Mitchell family filed a section 198360 suit against 
their city’s municipal police claiming a Third Amendment violation.61 
The police had removed the family members from their homes to gain 
a “tactical advantage” over the family’s neighbor, whom the police were 
investigating on a domestic violence call.62 The officers ended up 
forcibly removing both Anthony and Linda Mitchell from their homes, 
and thereafter using their places to aid in their investigation. 
The Mitchell court identified the rights protected by the Third 
Amendment: “[U]nder Griswold, the Third Amendment protects pri-
vate citizens from incursion by the military into their property interests, 
and guarantees the military's subordinate role to civil authority.”63 The 
court held that a municipal police officer is not a “soldier” under the 
Third Amendment.64 The court stated this “squares with the purpose 
of the Third Amendment because this was not a military intrusion into 
a private home, and thus the intrusion is more effectively protected by 
the Fourth Amendment.”65 Given this preliminary conclusion, the court 
never reached the question of what constitutes “quartering.”66 The 
court also did not address whether the incorporation question could 
alter the inquiry. This is not particularly surprising, however, given 
 
57. No. 06-28-P-S, 2007 WL 1576744 (D. Me. May 30, 2007). 
58. Id. at *7. 
59. Id. 
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (providing civil remedies for constitutional 
violations by governmental actors). 
61. Mitchell v. City of Henderson, No. 2:13-cv-01154, 2015 WL 427835, at *5 
(D. Nev. Feb. 2, 2015). 
62. Id. at *1. 
63.  Id. at *18. 
64. Id.  
65. Id. 
66. Id. (“I need not reach the question of whether the occupation at issue in this 
case constitutes quartering, though I suspect it would not.”). 
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that the Mitchell family didn’t make any incorporation-based 
argument.67 Nor did the family attempt to argue the link between 
“soldiers” and municipal police.68 
B. The Gap in Scholarly Commentary 
Scholarly treatment of the Third Amendment, like treatment from 
the judiciary, is wanting.69 Much of the Third Amendment legal com-
mentary has revolved around unique ways in which Third Amendment 
violations may be currently taking place. Some have advanced 
arguments characterizing federal government wiretapping as 
“quartering.”70 One scholar has urged that the Third Amendment is 
violated in current schemes under which the federal government fin-
ancially induces private universities to accept on-campus military 
recruiting.71 Another scholar has cautioned about the potential for 
Third Amendment violations during domestic natural disasters, like 
 
67. Plaintiffs’ Combined Opposition to: (1) Defendants City of Henderson, 
Nevada, Jutta Chambers, Garrett Poiner, Ronald Feola, Ramona Walls, 
Angela Walter, Christopher Worley & Janette R. Reyes-Speer’s Motion to 
Dismiss First Amended Complaint (CR17); and (2) Defendants City of 
North Las Vegas, Joseph Chronister, Michael Waller, Drew Albers, David 
Cawthorn, Eric Rockwell & Travis Snyder’s Joinder Thereto (CR23) at 57, 
Mitchell v. City of Henderson, 2015 WL 427835 (D. Nev. Feb. 2, 2015) (No. 
2:13-cv-01154-APG-CWH). 
68. Id. at 55–58. 
69. One scholar recently endeavored to canvas all of the scholarly literature on 
the Third Amendment in less than twenty pages. Scott D. Gerber, An 
Unavoidably Brief Historiography of the Third Amendment, 82 Tenn. L. 
Rev. 627 (2015). 
70. See, e.g., Mike Gatto, Opinion, A Redcoat Solution to Government 
Surveillance, L.A. Times (Sept. 29, 2015, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes 
.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-gatto-surveillance-3rd-amendment-20150929-
story.html [https://perma.cc/J7WU-R8S5] (suggesting that the “federal 
government’s military-run surveillance” may constitute a “modern form of 
quartering troops in our homes”); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Quartering 
Spyware Troops in the Digital Age, USA Today (Mar. 2, 2015, 1:55 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/03/01/constitutional-law-
third-amendment-quartering-column/24220593/ [https://perma.cc/M3AF-
AD5R] (explaining that the Third Amendment extends beyond its literal 
meaning of having troops move into one’s home); Josh Dugan, When Is a 
Search Not a Search? When It’s a Quarter: The Third Amendment, 
Originalism, and NSA Wiretapping, 97 Geo. L.J. 555 (2009) (arguing that 
the Founders used the word “quartering” expansively to refer to substantial 
governmental intrusions that threatened the rule of law). 
71. Geoffrey M. Wyatt, The Third Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: 
Military Recruiting on Private Campuses, 40 New Eng. L. Rev. 113 (2005) 
(challenging federal programs requiring universities to host military 
recruiters in order to receive certain types of federal funding). 
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Hurricane Katrina, where National Guardsmen might, out of necessity, 
commandeer private establishments.72 
As of late, the Mitchell case has engendered renewed interest in the 
Third Amendment.73 Perhaps driven by the heightened scrutiny placed 
on police departments within the last few years, some have been eager 
to tie the Third Amendment’s prohibitions to police abuses through a 
dynamic interpretation of “soldier.”74 None of them, however, 
sufficiently appreciate incorporation and the way it can expand the 
inquiry. Similarly, while a team of scholars has recently written about 
Third Amendment incorporation,75 they did not consider it in light of 
the police-as-soldiers question. These omissions are mistaken, for 
incorporation serves as a mechanism by which the U.S. Supreme Court 
could find that the Third Amendment restricts America’s state and 
local law enforcement forces. 
II. The Significance of the Incorporation Question 
Should the Supreme Court consider whether “soldier,” as used in 
the Third Amendment, encompasses municipal police, the Court would 
have to undertake a two step analysis. That is, the Third Amendment 
would have to be interpreted in two distinct historical contexts. At step 
one, the Court would likely interpret the text of the Third Amendment, 
as understood by the Framers of the Constitution. At step two, the 
inquiry is significantly expanded. We consider whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporates the Third Amendment 
 
72. James P. Rogers, Note, Third Amendment Protections in Domestic 
Disasters, 17 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 747, 748–49 (2008). 
73. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, A Real Live Third Amendment Case, Volokh 
Conspiracy (July 4, 2013, 6:16 PM), http://volokh.com/2013/07/04/a-
real-live-third-amendment-case/ [https://perma.cc/G7L6-M6MK] (discussing 
recent Third Amendment litigation). 
74. See, e.g., Elizabeth Price Foley, The “War” Against Crime: Ferguson, Police 
Militarization and the Third Amendment, 82 Tenn. L. Rev. 583 (2015) 
(considering police as “soldiers” in the context of the Third-Amendment); 
Sandra Eismann-Harpen, Note, Rambo Cop: Is He a Soldier Under the Third 
Amendment, 41 N. Ky. L. Rev. 119 (2014) (suggesting that police may “fall 
within the meaning of soldier under the Third Amendment”); Samantha A. 
Lovin, Note, Everyone Forgets About the Third Amendment: Exploring the 
Implications on Third Amendment Case Law of Extending Its Prohibitions 
to Include Actions by State Police Officers, 23 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 
529 (2014) (discussing the protections available to the general public when 
police officers “go beyond their constitutionally established boundaries”). 
75. E. Duncan Getchell, Jr., Matthew D. Fender & Michael H. Brady, Are the 
Rights Guaranteed by the Third Amendment Sufficiently Deep Rooted and 
Fundamental to Be Incorporated into the Fourteenth?, 82 Tenn L. Rev. 
575 (2015) (examining the contemporary application of Third Amendment 
jurisprudence). 
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against state and local governments. This inquiry concerns whether the 
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment viewed the right in question as 
fundamental.  
In this Part, I will explain how the incorporation analysis can alter 
the meaning of an unincorporated protection within the Bill of Rights. 
Then I will illustrate my point by recounting how incorporation 
significantly expanded application, and perhaps the meaning, of the 
Second Amendment. 
A. Incorporation and the Bill of Rights 
Two features of incorporation provide potential avenues for ex-
panding the Third Amendment’s protections. First, incorporation ex-
pands the universe of subjects bound by the prohibitions contained in 
the Bill of Rights, namely state and local governmental actors. While 
intuitive, this feature cannot be overstated. After all, incorporation 
made the First Amendment applicable to state and local governments76 
despite the Amendment’s explicit language (“Congress shall make no 
law . . .”),77 which would appear to preclude such application. Second, 
courts ask whether a given right or protection in the Bill of Rights is 
fundamental, and hence ought to apply to state and local governments. 
That question is answered by looking to congressional attitudes at the 
time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification rather than at the 
time of the Bill of Rights.78 
Thus, application of a Bill of Rights protection to state actors, 
coupled with the distinct emphasis on 1868, can result in constitutional 
protection that is different than the Framers intended. Crucially, the 
incorporation question is likely to lend itself to more flexible inter-
pretations than analysis of original intent would. The most recently 
incorporated amendment of the Bill of Rights—the Second 
Amendment—provides an illustration of the potential that the incor-
poration doctrine holds. 
 
76. See, e.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 295 (1951) (finding a municipal 
ordinance unconstitutional under the First Amendment). 
77. U.S. Const. amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”). 
78. See Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and 
Reconstruction 223 (1998) (“Mechanical incorporation . . . made it easy 
to forget that when we ‘apply’ the Bill of Rights against the states today, 
we must first and foremost reflect on the meaning and the spirit of the 
amendment of 1866, not the Bill of 1789.”). 
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B. Incorporation and the Second Amendment 
Heller is a crucial consideration to the present Third Amendment 
inquiry, as it showcases how the contemporary U.S. Supreme Court 
interprets an amendment of the Bill of Rights (step one). McDonald is 
even more significant, for it illustrates how the incorporation question 
(step two) calls for analysis distinct and separate from that of step one. 
Together, they expose how the Court crafted a new interpretation of 
an arguably antiquated right—the Second Amendment—and divorced 
the protection from its original militia-related purpose. 
1. Heller and Step One 
Prior to Heller, the Second Amendment79 was scrutinized by the 
U.S. Supreme Court only a handful of times.80 In those cases, the Court 
reaffirmed time and again that the Second Amendment only guarantees 
an individual a right to keep and bear firearms in connection with 
service in the militia.81 Given the Amendment’s uncontested militia-
related purpose, the U.S. Supreme Court declared the Second 
Amendment “must be interpreted and applied with that end in view.”82 
In 2008, the Heller Court took many constitutional scholars83 by 
surprise when it recognized that the Second Amendment to the Con-
stitution confers an individual right to bear arms for self-defensive 
 
79. The Second Amendment reads, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary 
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, 
shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. 
80. See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) (explaining 
that the Second Amendment shall not be infringed by Congress); Presser v. 
Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1886) (holding that state law prohibiting 
citizens from drilling or parading with arms in cities and towns does not 
infringe the right of the people to keep and bear arms); United States v. 
Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (holding that because a shotgun with a 
barrel less than eighteen inches in length did not have a reasonable 
relationship to the preservation of a well regulated militia, the Second 
Amendment did not guarantee a right to keep and bear such a weapon). 
81. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (stating that the Second Amendment guarantees 
no right to keep and bear a firearm that does not have “some reasonable 
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia”); see 
also Presser, 116 U.S. at 265 (stating that the Second Amendment “is a 
limitation only upon the power of Congress and the National government, 
and not upon that of the States”). 
82. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178. 
83. See, e.g., Nathan Kozuskanich, Originalism, History, and the Second 
Amendment: What Did Bearing Arms Really Mean to the Founders?, 10 U. 
Pa. J. Const. L. 413 (2008) (finding that historical evidence in the form of 
various documents shows that Congress intended to employ the right to bear 
arms in a military sense only); Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second 
Amendment Mean Today?, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 291 (2000) (finding that 
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purposes, unconnected to service in the militia.84 Prior to that holding, 
John Hart Ely observed that, because the Second Amendment’s pre-
fatory clause contains an explicit purpose—that is, the end of a “well 
regulated militia”—the Framers apparently sought to foreclose alter-
native interpretations.85 Similarly, Akhil Amar wrote, “to see the 
[Second] Amendment as primarily concerned with an individual right 
to hunt, or protect one’s home, is like viewing the heart of the speech 
and assembly clauses [of the First Amendment] as the right of persons 
to meet to play bridge, or to have sex.”86 
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia made his case by looking to 
the Amendment’s text, English history, legislative history, commentary 
by scholars, and legislative treatment by individual states in the wake 
of the Constitution’s ratification.87 In doing so, Scalia distinguished 
between reasons for codification on the one hand, and underlying 
rationale behind the right on the other. Despite the Court’s 5–4 divide, 
both dissenting opinions and the majority agreed that the codification 
of the Amendment was about preventing the federal government from 
disarming state militias.88 Where the majority and dissenting opinions 
disagreed is on whether self-defense is “the central component of the 
right itself.”89 Given this distinction, Justice Scalia framed the right by 
 
an interpretation of the Second Amendment’s doctrine, text, original under-
standing, structural inference, post-adoption history, and normative con-
siderations all suggest that the Second Amendment is not to be expanded to 
an individual’s right to bear arms in a non-military sense); David Yassky, 
The Second Amendment: Structure, History, and Constitutional Change, 99 
Mich. L. Rev. 588 (2000) (finding that the revisionist view of the Second 
Amendment’s right to bear arms for an individual purpose departs from the 
Founders’ original intent). 
84. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008). 
85. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 95 (1980). 
86. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131, 
1164 (1991). 
87. Heller, 554 U.S. at 576–603. 
88. See id. at 599 (“[T]he threat that the new Federal Government would destroy 
the citizens’ militia by taking away their arms was the reason that right—
unlike some other English rights—was codified in a written Constitution.”); 
id. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[The Second Amendment] was a 
response to concerns raised during the ratification of the Constitution that 
the power of Congress to disarm the state militias and create a national 
standing army posed an intolerable threat to the sovereignty of the several 
States.”). 
89. Id. at 599; see also id. at 681 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Second 
Amendment protects militia-related, not self-defense-related interests. These 
two interests are sometimes intertwined . . . But self-defense alone, detached 
from any militia-related objective, is not the Amendment’s concern.”). 
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emphasizing the broader concept of self-defense, thus dispensing with 
the need to be restrained by the Amendment’s militia-centered intent. 
2. McDonald and Step Two 
Two years after Heller, the Supreme Court considered whether the 
Second Amendment was incorporated through the Fourteenth 
Amendment and, if so, what the content and scope of the right is, as 
applied to the states and municipalities.90 The magnitude of this inquiry 
cannot be overstated. Once the Heller Court declared that the Second 
Amendment protects an individual right from federal interference, the 
incorporation question left open a range of possibilities for what the 
right might look like, as applied to municipalities and other 
subdivisions. First, however, it is important to consider the doctrinal 
boundaries of incorporation, as discussed in McDonald. 
The McDonald majority affirmed the Court’s central holding in the 
Slaughter-House Cases.91 Namely, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause, and not the Privileges or Immunities Clause, is the 
vehicle through which incorporation operates.92 The majority noted 
that, while Justice Hugo Black’s theory of “total incorporation”93 was 
never adopted, the Court has nonetheless moved in that direction 
through “selective incorporation.”94 That is, the Court doesn’t merely 
assume that each protection within the Bill of Rights applies against 
the states. Rather, each unincorporated provision will require its own 
Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Analysis.95 
Second, the Court affirmed that it would continue to abandon a 
“two-track” approach under which “the Fourteenth Amendment app-
lies to the States only a watered-down, subjective version of the in-
dividual guarantees of the Bill of Rights.”96 Rather, the rights contained 
in the Bill of Rights apply to the states “according to the same 
 
90. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
91. Id. at 758 (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and 
Immunities Clause does not protect rights given by individual states—only 
those provided by the federal government). 
92. Id.; All of the Justices agree on this point, with the exception of Justice 
Thomas. See id. at 811 (Thomas, J., concurring) (concluding that the Second 
Amendment was incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause and not the “legal fiction” of 
the Court’s Substantive Due Process analysis). 
93. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89 (1947) (Black, J., concurring) (“I 
would follow what I believe was the original purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment—to extend to all the people of this nation the complete 
protection of the Bill of Rights.”). 
94. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 763. 
95. Id. at 763–65. 
96. Id. at 765 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1964)). 
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standards that protect those personal rights against federal encroach-
ment.”97 Similarly, the Court rejected treating the Second Amendment 
and, presumably other provisions in the Bill of Rights, as being in-
tended only against the federal government.98 Justice Stevens, in his 
dissent, argued that certain amendments, due to their nature, should 
not apply identically to the states, as they do to the federal govern-
ment.99 That is, some Bill of Rights amendments are federalism pro-
tections. Like the Tenth Amendment,100 the Second Amendment “is 
directed at preserving the autonomy of the sovereign States, and its 
logic therefore resists incorporation by a federal court against the 
states.”101 
Finally, the Court reiterated that the incorporation question pro-
ceeds by asking if the right in question is “fundamental to our scheme 
of ordered liberty.”102 Put another way, the Court asks whether the 
right is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”103 
Simultaneously, however, the McDonald Court frames the same inquiry 
as a question of whether “the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms among those 
fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.”104 
Given Heller, the Court frames the “central component” of the 
Second Amendment as the right to “individual self-defense.”105 The 
Court sought this route over a more specific framing (for example, 
asking whether the right to own a firearm in one’s home was funda-
mental). This allowed the Court considerable leeway in expanding the 
right protected by the Second Amendment. In fact, the Court explicitly 
 
97. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 10. 
98. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 764 (“The Court also shed any reluctance to hold 
that rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights met the requirements for pro-
tection under the Due Process Clause.”). 
99. Id. at 866–70 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Judge Easterbrook of the 7th Circuit 
interpreted the Second Amendment this way. See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. 
v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 859 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that state 
prohibitions on firearms, even those implicating self-defense interests, are 
not precluded by Heller). 
100. “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people.” U.S. Const. amend. X. 
101. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 897 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
102. Id. at 764 (emphasis omitted). 
103. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City 
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). 
104. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 778. 
105. Id. at 767. 
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conceded that the original basis for adopting the Second Amendment 
was no longer relevant.106 
The Court also reconfirmed that the historical analysis of events 
leading up to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment was necessary 
to understanding the nature of the incorporated right. Specifically, the 
Court looked at American values and practices from the Nation’s 
founding through the Civil War, the legislative history pertaining to 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and how individual states treated firearm 
ownership.107 Thus, as long as the individual right of gun ownership for 
self-defense predominated in the minds of the Reconstruction Congress, 
the specific worries of the founding fathers need not hinder the 
Amendment’s reach. 
III. The Third Amendment in 1789: Step One 
In this Part, I will demonstrate how the Third Amendment, as 
understood in 1789, was drafted deliberately with a limited scope. That 
is, the Amendment was drafted in response to the ubiquitous presence 
of the British army in the colonies, particularly in Boston, where this 
brought about the Boston Tea Party and, ultimately, the American 
Revolution. However, the language of the Amendment only captures a 
small slice of those colonial grievances—the forced quartering of soldiers 
during peacetime. Nonetheless, as Heller demonstrates, there is both a 
reason behind codification, on the one hand, and a reason—or perhaps 
reasons—behind the right itself, on the other. Thus, the Third 
Amendment carries more meaning than its restrictive language suggests 
at face value. Nonetheless, I will conclude this Part by illustrating the 
inherent weakness in arguing that the Framers of the Constitution 
would have interpreted “soldiers” to include municipal police. 
A. Original Intent 
The Third Amendment provides, “No soldier shall, in time of peace 
be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in 
time of war, but in a manner prescribed by law.”108 The first clause 
contains a prohibition on the quartering of soldiers during peacetime. 
As with a handful of other amendments within the Bill of Rights, the 
clause’s text provides for an absolute prohibition. The second clause 
 
106. See id. at 770 (“By the 1850’s, the perceived threat that had prompted the 
inclusion of the Second Amendment in the Bill of Rights—the fear that the 
National Government would disarm the universal militia—had largely faded 
as a popular concern, but the right to keep and bear arms was highly valued 
for purposes of self-defense.”). 
107. Id. at 770–77. 
108. U.S. Const. amend. III. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 2·2016 
The Third Amendment Incorporated 
554 
provides that quartering may be appropriate during wartime, providing 
it is done so through formal, legal means. 
Around the time of the Constitution’s ratification, the verb 
“quarter” was understood to mean “to station or lodge soldiers” and 
“to lodge; to fix in a temporary dwelling.”109 Soldier was defined as “one 
who performs military service for pay; a warrior; a common man in a 
regiment.”110 Thus, the Amendment, based on text alone, provides an 
absolute protection for homeowners from forced lodging by military 
personnel. So, what exactly drove the Framers to include the Third 
Amendment? 
The presence of a large, foreign military force, unanswerable to the 
local colonists was central to the concerns of the founding fathers in the 
lead-up to the Revolutionary War. The quartering of British soldiers in 
Colonial America took root as a widespread phenomenon during the 
French and Indian War.111 The war had required a dramatic increase in 
the number of British soldiers stationed in the colonies.112 In response 
to this influx, the British Parliament passed the first Quartering Act in 
1765.113 The Act provided that American colonists were required to bear 
the financial burden of housing, supplying, and feeding British 
soldiers.114 
The residual British soldiers that remained in the colonies during 
peacetime, once the French and Indian War had subsided, caused ten-
sion between the soldiers and American colonists.115 The tension became 
particularly pronounced after 1768, when the British began using their 
soldiers in the colonies for law enforcement.116 This, in turn, led to 
rebellion among the colonists and manifested itself in, among other 
things, the Boston Tea Party.117 
 
109. 2 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (8th ed. 
1799). 
110. 1 John Ash, The New and Complete Dictionary of the English 
Language (1775). 
111. J. Alan Rogers, Colonial Opposition to the Quartering of Troops During 
the French and Indian War, 34 Military Affairs 7, 7–8 (1970). 
112. Id. 
113. Quartering Act, 1765, 5 Geo. 3, c. 33 (Eng.). 
114. Id. 
115. B. Carmon Hardy, A Free People’s Intolerable Grievance: The Quartering 
of Troops and the Third Amendment, 33 Va. Cavalcade 126, 130 (1984). 
116. Id. at 132. 
117. Seymour W. Wurfel, Quartering of Troops: The Unlitigated Third 
Amendment, 21 Tenn. L. Rev. 723, 726 (1951). 
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In response to the colonial unrest, the British Parliament passed a 
new Quartering Act in 1774.118 Known as one of the “Intolerable Acts,” 
the Act further authorized quartering in private homes.119 The First 
Continental Congress shortly thereafter passed a resolution condemning 
the legislation, declaring that, “the raising or keeping a standing army 
within these Colonies in time of peace, unless it be with the consent of 
the Provincial Legislatures, is illegal, pernicious, and dangerous; and 
that every statute for quartering and supplying troops within the said 
Colonies is illegal and void.”120 
Accordingly, the practice received special attention in the Declar-
ation of Independence. The Declaration provides, in relevant part, “He 
has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the 
Consent of our legislatures.121 He has affected to render the Military 
independent of and superior to the Civil power . . . [f]or Quartering 
large bodies of armed troops among us . . . .”122 
As this history suggests, the grievance that made its way into the 
Third Amendment was the most specific formulation of a much broader 
grievance. Nonetheless, it appears that there was no consideration over 
whether to broaden the Amendment’s reach. For example, five of the 
eight states that requested specific articles for consideration in the new 
nation’s Constitution specifically called for prohibitions on the 
quartering of soldiers.123 Of the eight states that submitted proposed 
quartering amendments, there were two general versions.124 One, 
exemplified by Maryland and New Hampshire, contained an absolute 
prohibition on quartering of soldiers in times of peace, but was silent 
on its application during wartime.125 The other version, requested by 
states including Virginia, New York, and North Carolina, included 
language mirroring the Third Amendment.126 That is, while forced 
quartering was categorically prohibited during peace, allowances by law 
would be permissible during times of war. Despite their differences, all 
of these proposals provided absolute protection to homeowners from 
forced lodging by military personnel. 
 
118. Id. at 726; Quartering Act, 1774, 14 Geo. 3, c. 54 (Eng.). 
119. William Sutton Fields, The Third Amendment: Constitutional Protection 
from the Involuntary Quartering of Soldiers, 124 Mil. L. Rev. 195, 201 
(1989). 
120. 1 Journals of the Continental Congress 69 (1774). 
121. The Declaration of Independence para. 13 (U.S. 1776). 
122. The Declaration of Independence paras. 13, 14 & 16 (U.S. 1776). 
123. Hardy, supra note 115, at 134. 
124. Bell, supra note 13, at 129–30. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 130. 
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In summary, the Amendment was a reaction to the large presence 
of British military troops across the American colonies. Thus, the 
Amendment, as it emerged, only prohibited a narrow category of 
abuse—forced occupation, by persons in the military, of a private 
person’s house, during peacetime. As discussed, the Quartering Acts 
authorized forced lodging in areas other than the home. Further, the 
colonists frequently aired their quartering-related concerns alongside 
their fears of standing armies. So, while the Amendment’s spirit tar-
geted more general abuses by the British military, it was certainly 
limited in scope. First, despite some initial disagreement among state 
legislatures, the text explicitly prohibits quartering only during peace. 
Second, the prohibition only applies to the home. Third, the restrictive 
words in the Amendment seemingly preclude application to any type of 
government actor. While limited in scope, that is not the end of the 
discussion. Just as Heller distinguished between reasons for codification 
versus rationale behind the right itself, there is a distinction to be 
parsed here. 
B. Reasons Behind the Right Itself 
As discussed, the specific reason for codification was to protect 
homeowners from forced lodging of members of a military unit. The 
reasons behind the right, on the other hand, are multifaceted. John 
Hart Ely, as an example, counted no less than three underlying values 
behind the Third Amendment. According to Ely, the Amendment is a 
“separation of powers provision,” a guarantee of “civilian control of the 
military,” and a “desire to protect the privacy of the home from prying 
government eyes.”127 Similarly, Justice Joseph Story captured the 
various facets of the Third Amendment when he wrote that “[t]his 
provision speaks for itself. Its plain object is to secure the perfect 
enjoyment of that great right of the common law, that a man’s house 
shall be his own castle, privileged against all civil and military intru-
sion.”128 Justice Warren Burger also summarized the Amendment’s 
spirit by writing, “the military must be subject to civilian control, and 
that the government cannot intrude into private homes without good 
reason.”129 
Of these underlying reasons behind the Third Amendment, two 
deserve close attention—the imperative of civil domination over mili-
tary affairs and the protection of the home from governmental intru-
 
127. Ely, supra note 85, at 95. 
128. 3 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United 
States 713, 747 (1833). 
129. Warren E. Burger, Introduction to Burnham Holmes, The American 
Heritage History of the Bill of Rights: The Third Amendment 6 (1991). 
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sion. This framework renders the Third Amendment a natural fit be-
tween the Second and Fourth Amendments. The Third Amendment 
flows from the Second, as both represent military-related prohibi-
tions.130 This is crucial, as the Framers of the Constitution saw an un-
checked military as a direct corollary to the infringement of individual 
rights. As Alexander Hamilton cautioned in The Federalist Papers, “[A 
strong military leads to the] frequent infringements on [the people’s] 
rights . . . and by degrees the people are brought to consider the soldiery 
not only as their protectors but as their superiors.”131 Thus, the Second 
and Third Amendments, read in concert, provide a constitutional check 
against any usurpation of power by federal military units. Where the 
Second Amendment solidifies the role of state militias by protecting 
them against disarmament, the Third Amendment limits federal 
members of the military from a specific tactic that was once 
commonplace. 
The Third Amendment can also be read in line with the Fourth 
Amendment in that both seek to safeguard the home from govern-
mental actors.132 Both the Third and Fourth Amendments reflect the 
longstanding common-law principle recognizing that “a man’s home is 
his castle.”133 As Blackstone wrote, “[T]he law of England has so par-
ticular and tender a regard to the immunity of a man’s house, that it 
stiles it his castle, and will never suffer it to be violated with impun-
ity.”134 Read in this light, both Amendments are homeowner-protection 
provisions, standing guard against a range of potential governmental 
 
130. See Amar, supra note 86, at 1174 (“Like the Second, the Third is centrally 
focused on the structural issue of protecting civilian values against the threat 
of an overbearing military.”); see also Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and 
the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 181, 185 (1962) (noting that the Second and 
Third Amendments were passed as assurances to the people who were “still 
troubled by the recollection of the conditions that prompted the charge of the 
Declaration of Independence that the King had ‘effected to render the military 
independent and superior to the civil power’”). 
131. The Federalist No. 8, at 36 (Alexander Hamilton) (P.F. Collier & Son 
rev. ed., 1901). 
132. See Akhil Reed Amar & Alan Hirsch, For the People: What the 
Constitution Really Says About Your Rights 133 (1998) (“To be 
sure, there is an important link between the Third Amendment and the 
Fourth (which restricts searches and seizes)—both protect ‘houses’ from 
needless and dangerous intrusions by government officials.”). 
133. See Edwardo Coke, Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of 
England 161 (London, E. & R. Brooke, 1797 ed.) (providing that, if 
nowhere else, a man is safe in his house). 
134. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *223. 
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abuses, including unreasonable searches and seizures and forced lodging 
for members of military units.135 
In summary, the reason behind codification was to protect home-
owners from forced lodging by “soldiers.” The reason behind the right 
itself was the guarantee of civil control over the military and the pro-
tection of homeowners from governmental intrusion. 
C. “Soldiers” and Law Enforcement 
The crucial question here is, to whom did the Framers of the Bill 
of Rights understand “soldier” to refer? There are a few narrow cate-
gories of persons whom the Framers of the Constitution understood as 
embodying soldiers (defined as, “one who performs military service for 
pay; a warrior; a common man in a regiment”).136 First, the Framers 
understood the British military as soldiers. After all, it was quartering 
by the British that brought about the Third Amendment. While the 
British soldiery would have no place in the new government of the 
United States, it is useful to consider to whom the Framers were 
reacting. 
The Framers inherited from the British—and as a result of the 
British—a grave fear of standing armies and concerns over military 
involvement in domestic law enforcement. Two British statutes in 1714 
confirm the distinction between the domestic law enforcement and 
military law enforcement. The Riot Act provided for civilian officials 
and the posse comitatus137 (civilian-volunteers) to disperse mobs and 
suppress civil disorders, and authorized those civilian personnel to use 
any degree of force necessary to accomplish the purpose.138 Distinctly, 
another Act, passed within the same year, provided for use of the militia 
in the event of “insurrection,” “rebellion,” or “invasion.”139 This 
bifurcation, however, didn’t stop the British from imposing military law 
enforcement on their subjects outside of England proper. 
 
135. See Morton J. Horwitz, Is the Third Amendment Obsolete?, 26 Val. U. L. 
Rev. 209, 214 (1991) (speculating that, “if the Fourth Amendment had 
never been enacted, the Third Amendment might have provided the raw 
material for generating something like an anti-search and seizure principle”). 
136. Ash, supra note 110. 
137. See Posse Comitatus, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (“[T]he 
power or force of the country.”); see also Sean J. Kealy, Reexamining the 
Posse Comitatus Act, 21 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 383, 389 (2003) (“[Posse 
comitatus] refers to the common law power of a county sheriff to summon a 
‘posse’—consisting of any able-bodied person over the age of fifteen years—
to assist him in keeping the peace, pursuing and arresting felons, and 
suppressing riots.”). 
138. David E. Engdahl, Soldiers, Riots, and Revolution: The Law and History 
of Military Troops in Civil Disorders, 57 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 16–17 (1971). 
139. Id. at 17. 
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The British enraged the pre-revolutionary colonists by providing 
legal protection for their soldiers, who were “used with increase[d] 
regularity for the suppression of tumults and civil disturbances.”140 
Specifically, during British occupation of Boston from 1768 until 1770, 
the British military began using their soldiers in the colonies for law 
enforcement.141 Its intention was to use its soldiery to enforce British 
law in Boston and to seek civil obedience.142 General Thomas Gage 
confirmed British intentions when he suggested the occupation “will 
strengthen the hands of government in the province of Massachusetts 
Bay, enforce a due obedience to the laws, and protect and support the 
civil magistrates and the officers of the Crown in the execution of their 
duty.”143 
Notably, the way the Framers of the Constitution responded to 
these events would sow the seeds for a century of federal and state 
governments utilizing soldiers in a domestic law enforcement ca-
pacity.144 That is, instead of proscribing military involvement in 
domestic law enforcement outright, the Framers opted instead to vest 
residual power in state militias. 
D. The New Domestic Soldiery 
The Framers would soon embed two general categories of soldiers—
the militia and the army—into the new Constitution.145 The roles of 
both of these types of soldiers were explicitly written to respect a 
federalist balance. Thus, the Framers of the Constitution struck a 
compromise by which the states would maintain militias, but the 
Congress could call the militia forth, if necessary.146 Here, the Framers 
 
140. Engdahl, supra note 138, at 26. 
141. Id. 
142. John Phillip Reid, In a Constitutional Void, 22 Wayne L. Rev. 1, 4 (1975) 
(“The Earl of Hillsborough, secretary of state in charge of colonial affairs . 
. . [told General Gage that the troops] ‘will strengthen the hands of 
government in the province of Massachusetts Bay, enforce a due obedience to 
the laws, and protect and support the civil magistrates and the officers of the 
Crown in the execution of their duty.’”). 
143. Id. 
144. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
145. Amar & Hirsch, supra note 132, at 129. 
146. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 16 (“The Congress shall have the Power . . . 
[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for 
governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United 
States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, 
and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed 
by Congress.” (emphasis added)). 
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responded by seeking a constitutional framework that would emphasize 
the use of state militias, rather than a federal standing army.147 
Notably, the enacted language would allow Congress to call forth 
the militia not only to “suppress [i]nsurrections and repel [i]nvasions,” 
but also to “execute the Laws of the Union.”148 This controversial pro-
vision survived the passage of the Constitution to the dismay of many 
Antifederalists.149 Nonetheless, the Federalists sought to assuage con-
cerns by assuring that the provision would only be used as a last resort. 
Hamilton insisted that the provision would only be invoked “against 
those violent invasions of them which amount to insurrections and 
rebellions.”150 
In addition, many in the framing generation viewed, and argued for 
the position that, the militia—being all “able bodied men”151—was a 
trustworthy source of power. Madison suggested state militias, given 
their localized nature, would be structured as to avoid the potential for 
tyranny inherent in a federal standing army.152 
E. The Limited Reach of Soldiers 
Given these categories of soldiers, the Third Amendment, as ori-
ginally understood, had a strikingly limited reach. First, federal soldiery 
at the time of ratification was virtually nonexistent, as President 
Washington had disbanded the Continental Army previously used to 
 
147. See Articles of Confederation of 1777, art. VI (“[N]or shall any body 
of forces be kept up, by any state, in time of peace, except such number only 
as, in the judgement of the united states, in congress assembled, shall be 
deemed requisite . . . but every state shall always keep up a well regulated 
and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and accounted.” (emphasis 
added)); U.S. Const. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary 
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, 
shall not be infringed.” (emphasis added)). 
148. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 15. 
149. See Saul Cornell, Mobs, Militias, and Magistrates: Popular 
Constitutionalism and the Whiskey Rebellion, 81 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 883, 
890 (2006) (discussing the debate between Federalists and Antifederalists 
concerning the role of the militia). 
150. The Federalist No. 28 (Alexander Hamilton). 
151. Militia, Webster’s American Dictionary of the English Language 
(1828) (defining “militia” as “able-bodied men organized into companies, 
regiments, and brigades, with officers of all grades, and required by law to 
attend military exercises on certain days only, but at other times left to 
pursue their usual occupations”). 
152. See The Federalist No. 46 (James Madison) (“[T]he existence of 
subordinate governments, to which the people are attached, and by which 
the militia officers are appointed, forms a barrier against the enterprises of 
ambition, more insurmountable than any which a simple government of any 
form can admit of.”). 
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fight the British.153 Second, state militias, logically, only counted as 
federal governmental actors when called forth by Congress. Regardless 
of its limited reach, however, the Third Amendment can be thought of 
as written prospectively, as a preventive measure against potential 
abuse of a regular army.154 
Either way, the Framers of the Constitution were aware of 
“soldiers” performing law enforcement roles and were certainly fearful 
of this becoming routine practice. However, the Constitution certainly 
did not preclude such application. One could say that this line of 
reasoning bolsters the argument that the Framers of the Constitution 
would have seen municipal police as “soldiers.” I argue, however, that 
this link is too attenuated because the Framers didn’t contemplate any 
state and local governments being bound by the Bill of Rights. It is 
important to bear in mind that the Bill of Rights, as originally penned, 
was understood to only bind the federal government.155 That is, the 
Third Amendment, like all of the Bill of Rights Amendments, was a 
vertical separation-of-powers provision. While James Madison initially 
floated the idea of the Bill of Rights constraining both state and federal 
governmental actors, the idea failed to garner support.156 I argue that 
certain historical developments after the Constitution’s ratification 
make a better case for applying the Third Amendment’s protections to 
state and local law enforcement. That is, incorporation analysis 
provides the necessary hook. 
IV. The Third Amendment Incorporated 
In this Part I first argue that the literal Third Amendment passes 
the McDonald test for incorporation. Then I show how alternative ways 
of framing the fundamental right at issue—that is, the reason behind 
the right itself—fare differently under the incorporation analysis. I 
advocate the position that, in order to survive incorporation analysis, 
the fundamental right behind the Third Amendment must be the 
American tradition of protecting the home from governmental 
 
153. David E. Engdahl, Foundations for Military Intervention in the United 
States, 7 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 1, 26 (1983). 
154. In 1792, shortly after the Bill of Rights was ratified, President Washington 
signed into law a measure creating a 5,000-person regular army. Horwitz, 
supra note 135, at 213. 
155. See Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250 (1833) (“In almost every 
convention by which the constitution was adopted, amendments to guard 
against the abuse of power were recommended. These amendments 
demanded security against the apprehended encroachments of the general 
government—not against those of the local governments.”). 
156. Brent Tarter, Virginians and the Bill of Rights, in The Bill of Rights: 
A Lively Heritage 15 (Jon Kukla ed. 1987). 
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intrusion. Framed properly, whether the Third Amendment restrains 
municipal police will hinge on an interpretation of the word “soldier,” 
the subject of the provision.157 Regardless of how the Framers of the 
Bill of Rights would have interpreted “soldier,” the Framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment certainly conceived of “soldiers” as encomp-
assing those who perform domestic law enforcement functions. That is, 
from the time immediately after the Constitution’s ratification, until 
1878—a decade after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification—federal 
and state governments progressively used the army, militia, and state 
militias for domestic, non-war-related, interventions. In many cases, 
militiamen were specifically used to supplement local police 
departments. One scholar has aptly termed this phenomenon the 
“police-ization” of the military.158  
Distinctly, another trend of the 1800s gives credence to the idea 
that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment would consider today’s 
police to be soldiers. The American police force of the 1800s looked 
nothing like the police force of today in terms of their roles, 
professionalism, and military characteristics. The phenomenon by 
which “police agencies and police officers take on more and more 
characteristics of an army” has been referred to as the “indirect mili-
tarization” of the police.159 Because the indirect militarization of police 
is a recent trend, it underscores the extent to which municipal police, 
in the nineteenth century, were wholly different from those of today. 
Based on these trends, I conclude the Fourteenth Amendment’s Fra-
mers would have conceived that the Third Amendment protection, as 
incorporated, has state and local police within its grasp. 
A. Framing the Right at Issue 
As discussed, the Third Amendment is loaded in terms of the fun-
damental rights it seeks to safeguard. The Third Amendment stands 
both for the proposition that the military must be subordinate to civil 
authority160 and that citizens must be protected, in their homes, from 
 
157. But see Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 
Stan. L. Rev. 1209, 1210 (2010) (arguing that a “bedrock question” of 
judicial review is “almost universally overlooked.” That is “before judicial 
review focuses on verbs, let alone objects, it should begin at the beginning, 
with subjects . . . [e]very constitutional inquiry should begin with . . . the 
who question: who has violated the Constitution?”) (italics in original). 
158. See Charles J. Dunlap, The Police-Ization of the Military, 27 J. Pol. & 
Mil. Soc. 217 (1999) (analyzing the growing use of the armed forces as 
police officers). 
159. Radley Balko, Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization of 
America’s Police Forces 35 (2013). 
160. See Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 181, 
186 (1962) (“[T]he axiom of subordination of the military to the civil . . . is so 
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governmental intrusion.161 However, only the latter justification—pro-
tection of privacy in the home—neatly survives incorporation analysis. 
This is because a pattern of governmental activity, from Independence 
to Reconstruction, directly conflicts with the civil-military relations 
rationale. 
From the time of the ratification of the Constitution, the lines be-
tween military and civil authority began to blur for almost a century. 
That is, the federal government began a trend of using the federal army, 
and state militias, for domestic law enforcement. This suggests that the 
fundamental nature behind limiting military power, relative to that of 
civilian authority, ceased to be of concern during the nineteenth 
century. Some have attributed this trend—the growing acceptance of 
standing armies—as the central reason for the Third Amendment’s 
failure to garner broader application in the courts.162 Others have 
argued that this trend makes the Third Amendment a poor candidate 
for incorporation.163 
In order to avoid this dilemma, it is crucial to frame the right in-
dependent of the civil-military relations rationale. Instead, it should be 
framed in terms of the primacy of the home and fundamental right to 
be free from governmental intrusion. This framing comports with the 
Amendment’s intent, given that the language was a specific formulation 
of an otherwise general grievance. That is, while the Framers 
complained of ubiquitous British soldiers,164 they would pen an 
amendment—the Third—to address only the most objectionable aspect 
of military power: the effect on the rights of homeowners. When framed 
in terms of privacy rights in the home, the blurring of the lines between 
civil and military law enforcement can be used as an advantage in 
 
deeply rooted in our national experience that it must be regarded as an 
essential constituent of the fabric of our political life.”). 
161. See Story, supra note 128, at 747 (concluding that the Third 
Amendment stands for the proposition that “a man’s house shall be his own 
castle, privileged against all civil and military intrusion”). 
162. See Horwitz, supra note 135, at 213 (concluding that, notwithstanding 
President Jefferson’s reduction in the size of the regular army—from 5,000 
to 3,300—“the legitimacy of a standing army came to be accepted,” 
rendering it unable to “draw off the symbolic energy of those who might 
otherwise have turned to the Third Amendment to support their fears of 
the military or to insist that only a people’s militia comported with 
Republican principles”). 
163. See Amar, supra note 78, at 267 (arguing that two considerations of original 
intent make the Third Amendment a “poor candidate for unrefined, 
mechanical incorporation: 1860s Republicans did not share their small-r- 
forbears’ disdain for central armies, and surely [the Reconstruction Congress] 
did not mean to impose every aspect of federal separation of powers onto 
states”). 
164. See supra Part III.A. 
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applying the Third Amendment’s protections against state and local 
law enforcement.  
B. The Third Amendment and Step Two 
The right to be protected from forced quartering of members of a 
military unit, given the sanctity of the home, is “fundamental to our 
scheme of ordered liberty”165 and “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
and tradition.”166 This protection of the home against forced quartering 
of soldiers has origins dating back to the Middle Ages.167 In the modern 
era, the first codification of such a right was expressed in 1628 in the 
British Parliament’s Petition of Right.168 The Parliament was 
responding to concerns that “soldiers and mariners have been dispersed 
into divers counties of the realm, and the inhabitants against their wills 
have been compelled to receive them into their houses . . . against the 
laws and customs of this realm and to the great grievance and vexation 
of the people.”169 
Accordingly, protection from the forced quartering of troops also 
made its way into the English Bill of Rights of 1689.170 Shortly there-
after, however, the British Parliament reaffirmed, but limited, this 
protection.171 The Mutiny Act allowed local civilian magistrates to 
direct soldiers to be stationed in “alehouses, inns, stables, and the 
like.”172 Significantly, the Act specified that private homes were off-
limits from quartering in absence of the owner’s consent.173 Also, the 
Act did not apply to British soldiers stationed in the American Col-
onies.174 As discussed previously, this spiraled into quartering during 
and after the French and Indian War, and ultimately, the Intolerable 
Acts, which led to the American Revolution.175 
Here I should note a potential stumbling block in the incorporation 
analysis. That is, the United States government forced quartering of 
federal soldiers in civilian homes during the War of 1812 and the Civil 
 
165. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 764 (2010) (emphasis omitted). 
166. Id. at 767 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)). 
167. Fields, supra note 119, at 196. 
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War.176 Because these occupations took place in the context of war, 
they were not absolutely proscribed by the Third Amendment.177 In the 
case of the War of 1812, Congress passed an Act to provide for 
compensating homeowners for property damage related to quartering, 
but only did so after the war.178 During the Civil War, Congress passed 
a law permitting the confiscation of Confederate property, but had no 
similar provision allowing for quartering in Union-friendly homes.179 
Congress contemplated creating a system for property-damage claims, 
but ultimately declined to compensate those whose homes were 
occupied.180 Once the Civil War ended, the former Confederate states, 
except for Tennessee, were divided into five military districts.181 For the 
most part, the federal soldiery was quartered in permanent or semi-
permanent military camps, tents or rented buildings, and forts.182 Some 
of the military districts implemented policies restricting quartering, 
perhaps in acknowledgement of the undesirability of forced 
quartering.183 
Thus, it is unclear how these abuses affect the analysis, or whether 
this concern is offset by acknowledgement of those grievances by 
Congress and individual Military Districts. Because most of these 
abuses took place during war, it is unclear whether they meet the Third 
Amendment’s “in a manner to be prescribed by law” test.184 Even 
assuming, arguendo, that these war-time abuses constituted Third 
Amendment violations, that does not, in and of itself, compel the 
conclusion that the Reconstruction Congress dispensed with the values 
underlying the Third Amendment.185 
 
176. Bell, supra note 13, at 137–38. 
177. See U.S. Const. amend. III (“No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered 
in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in 
a manner to be prescribed by law.” (emphasis added)). 
178. Bell, supra note 13, at 137 n.162. 
179. James P. Rogers, Note, Third Amendment Protections in Domestic 
Disasters, 17 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 747, 756 (2008). 
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Reconstruction Period 5 (1958). 
182. Id. at 251. 
183. For example, the Department of Georgia (Third Military District) required 
approval from its headquarters, and the Department of Mississippi (Fourth 
Military District) absolutely banned the practice in absence of the home-
owner’s consent. See id. at 33. 
184. U.S. Cont. amend. III. 
185. For example, President Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus via the Habeas 
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Nevertheless, these wrinkles are balanced out by the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s legislative history. Leading proponents of the Fourteenth 
Amendment explicitly argued that the Amendment’s effect would be to 
incorporate the first eight amendments against the states.186 The Third 
Amendment received explicit attention during these debates. For 
example, on May 23, 1866, Senator Jacob M. Howard said on the Senate 
floor that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to states, “the right to 
be exempt from the quartering of soldiers in a house without the consent 
of the owner.”187 Representative John Bingham, a principal Framer of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, recognized the Amendment would protect 
the “inviolability of [individuals’] homes in time of peace, in that no 
soldier should be quartered in any house without the consent of the 
owner.”188 
Further, at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, 
twenty-seven states—two-thirds of the states at the time—had explicit 
prohibitions on the quartering of troops in their respective 
Constitutions.189 All of these provisions generally mirrored190 the lan-
guage of the Third Amendment. Even the Confederate Constitution, 
although no longer valid after the Civil War, contained an explicit anti-
quartering provision.191 
Thus, the protection of homeowners against forced quartering is 
deeply rooted in American history and was recognized as such by the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Framers. It should not, however, be thought 
of, or framed, as strictly a military provision. Heller and McDonald 
made clear that an amendment codified as a military-related provision 
doesn’t preclude it from being read in a different light. In that case, the 
Court effectively dispensed with the prefatory clause (“A well regulated 
 
U.S. 36, 114 (1873) (finding that habeas corpus is a fundamental right and is 
among the “privileges and immunities [that] attach as well to citizenship of 
the United States as to citizenship of the States”). 
186. It should be noted, however, that these arguments proceeded under the 
assumption that the privileges or immunities clause was the vehicle for 
incorporation. 
187. Chester James Antieau, The Intended Significance of the 
Fourteenth Amendment 118 (1997). 
188. Id. 
189. Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State 
Constitutions When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: 
What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 
Tex. L. Rev. 7, 56 (2008). 
190. Id.; see, e.g., Oh. Const. art. I, § 13 (1851) (“No soldier shall, in time of 
peace, be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner; nor, in 
time of war, except in a manner prescribed by law.”). 
191. Const. of the Confederate States of America art. I, § 9, cl. 14 
(1861). 
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militia . . . ”) in favor of a non-military-related interpretation.192 Here, 
the right against forced quartering, at its core, is about protecting the 
home from governmental intrusion, regardless of the military-related 
connotations of the words “soldier” and “quarter.” 
1. Soldiers and Domestic Law Enforcement 
As mentioned, the Constitution’s Framers were conscious of the 
potential for the use of soldiers in domestic law enforcement. Regardless 
of the Framers’ immediate intentions, from America’s independence 
until the Reconstruction era, both federal and state governments used 
militias for domestic law enforcement. This is not to suggest that the 
military—whether the standing army or the militia—was routinely used 
in “direct law enforcement,” as in arrest or search authority, although 
that did happen as well.193 But these “soldiers” were mobilized to 
enforce domestic laws in situations, the gravity of which fell short of 
war, invasion, insurrection, or other legitimate challenges to governing 
authority and rule of law. 
This began with the Militia Act of 1792, which required all free, 
white men between eighteen and forty-five to be enlisted in a state 
militia.194 A new amendment also allowed the executive, rather than 
Congress, to mobilize the militia if requested by state governors or 
legislatures.195 The legislation was understood as allowing the executive 
to mobilize these forces not as soldiers, but as “civilians” or posse 
comitatus, at least so far as the law was concerned.196 
The Act was first utilized in 1794 to suppress the Whiskey Re-
bellion, a series of riots and protests against the federal government’s 
imposition of a tax on whiskey.197 In addition to suppressing the re-
bellion, Alexander Hamilton instructed the militia to assist in civil law 
enforcement functions.198 These instructions included supporting “civil 
officers in the means of executing the laws,” which may require taking 
 
192. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
193. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., The Police-Ization of the Military, 27 J. Pol. & 
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prisoners and delivering them to civil magistrates and even “seizing the 
stills of delinquent distillers.”199 
This trend would continue, unabated, for the next seventy years.200 
One military historian estimated that federal officials deployed the 
army “at least seventy-two times to help quell major disorders and 
other challenges to civil authority.”201 Federal troops were also used for 
objectively non-combat related law enforcement. For example, the army 
was mobilized to assist locals in enforcing a law barring certain private 
contracts between Native Americans and U.S. citizens (1796) and to 
evict squatters from public land (1807).202 A subsequent 1807 
amendment further expanded executive authority over use of these 
soldiers, allowing their use for broader categories of law enforcement.203 
In the lead up to the Civil War, federal officials also mobilized the 
army to capture and return runaway slaves, pursuant to the Fugitive 
Slave Act of 1850.204 Presidents Fillmore and Pierce both permitted 
federal officials to summon state militias to enforce the Act.205 One in-
famous and contentious case was that of Anthony Burns, a runaway 
slave who sought refuge in Boston.206 Burns was apprehended by an 
“enormous cortège of Boston police, state militia, and United States 
troops,” and was delivered back to “the custody of his master aboard a 
ship bound for Virginia.”207 
Both administrations had justified the use of state militias in en-
forcing the Act by suggesting they were merely summoning the posse 
comitatus—mere citizen-volunteers—rather than soldiers.208 Known as 
the Cushing Doctrine,209 this dubious justification would serve as a 
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precedent that allowed the federal government, over the next several 
years, to avoid the tough questions posed by the trend of military en-
forcement of domestic law. 
In 1861, Congress again granted the executive further authority to 
utilize the militia and armed forces and made doing so even easier.210 
According to one scholar, the Civil War and Reconstruction period 
“marked the apex of military law enforcement.”211 
Following the Civil War, southern former-Confederate states were 
occupied militarily and split into five military districts.212 Non-war-
related law enforcement was among the occupying army’s roles as the 
soldiers assisted with “controlling the illegal production of liquor, su-
ppressing labor disputes, and enforcing Reconstruction policies.”213 
Only after passage of the Fourteenth Amendment did the 
Reconstruction Congress seek to reign in the use of the military for 
domestic law enforcement purposes. In 1878, Congress passed the Posse 
Comitatus Act, which prohibited the federal government from using 
troops in a domestic law enforcement capacity, save for a few narrow 
exceptions.214 The Act was passed in direct response to “[s]outhern 
anger over this use of federal soldiers to uphold the laws of carpetbagger 
governments.”215 
The states, for their part, also utilized their militias for domestic, 
non-combat law enforcement. The militias were seen as an “extension 
of the police” and were called forth by state legislatures and governors 
to calm civil riots.216 One historian compiled a brief, non-exhaustive list 
of examples of state governments calling forth their militias in their 
domestic law enforcement capacities: 
[I]n New Orleans in the 1850s militia patrolled the streets after 
police were unable to prevent a wave of arson; they quelled an 
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anti-Spanish riot, were involved in mob actions during elections 
in 1854 and 1858, and they were called out over a bogus Negro 
insurrection . . . Militia were used in anti-bank riots in Baltimore 
(1835), in a Portland, Maine, riot (1855), caused by a dealer 
overcharging on alcoholic “medicines,” and in Philadelphia (1844) 
to separate rival fire companies. In Vicksburg the militia were 
used to destroy gambling dens . . . in Chicago to demolish houses 
of prostitution, while in Memphis two volunteer companies were 
called out to enforce collections of wharf fees.217 
It appears some state militias, too, viewed their own role as in-
cluding domestic law enforcement. In 1854, a contemporary military 
historian and former militiaman wrote, “the militia are, after all, how-
ever unpalatable the truth may be, neither more or less than an 
Auxiliary Police Force, and for the last forty odd years that is the only 
duty they have ever been called upon to perform.”218 In 1864, the United 
States Service Magazine opined about the New York State militia, 
observing, “Although [New York is] possessed of an excellent police, 
there are times of popular excitement when our metropolis must rely 
upon the presence of an armed force for the preservation of public peace. 
The organized militia are particularly adapted to this duty.”219 
2. The Police of the Nineteenth Century vs. Police of Today 
If the militia and army were used so frequently in domestic law 
enforcement, where were the police? First of all, from the nation’s 
founding until 1868, police forces looked much different than they do 
today. The first modern-style police force—the London Metropolitan 
Police—took root in Great Britain in 1829 and would serve as the model 
for American cities like New York, Boston, and Chicago.220 As the first 
“modern-style” police were established in the United States in New 
York in 1845, officers were required to live in the wards in which they 
worked.221 Today, a vast majority of police officers don’t live in the 
communities they serve.222 
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Second, as America’s professional police force emerged, one of the 
prominent points of controversy was whether police should be required 
to wear uniforms. Members of the public objected that the uniforms 
were too militaristic in nature.223 In 1854, the New-York Daily Times 
covered a public meeting between police and the citizenry in which a 
local attorney claimed the uniforms represented the “commencement of 
the establishment in this City of a standing army.”224 This was 
problematic because Americans “from their infancy [were] taught to 
rely upon the spontaneous action of the citizen soldiery—the 
volunteers—when and where they were needed.”225 Nonetheless, the 
police departments of Philadelphia and Chicago slowly continued the 
trend by requiring uniforms in 1860 and 1861, respectively.226 However, 
as of 1860, only six cities in the United States had uniformed police 
departments.227 
Third, police originally had a significantly more limited scope. Early 
police work, during the 1800s, was characterized less as enforcers of 
criminal law, and more as social workers228 or a “kind of catchall or 
residual welfare agency.”229 Accordingly, New York’s first professional 
police force was originally unarmed.230 It wasn’t until 1887 that the New 
York Police Department first mandated that its officers carry 
firearms.231 
Today, police officers are not only armed, but are supplied many of 
their armaments from the Pentagon, as authorized by a 1994 law.232 
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The War on Terror has only exacerbated this trend. According to a 
study by the ACLU, the value in military equipment used by municipal 
police departments from 2001 to 2013 increased from one million to 
over four hundred million dollars.233 Since 2006 alone, state and 
municipal law enforcement have acquired “at least 435 armored ve-
hicles, 533 military aircraft and 93,763 machine guns.”234 
This has coincided with the contemporary phenomenon of wide-
spread reliance on police paramilitary units, like SWAT for example, 
which represents a significant phase of militarization.235 These police 
paramilitary units are modeled after special operations groups like the 
Navy Seals, and approximately half of the country’s units receive spe-
cialized training from current and former operatives of the Navy Seals 
and Army Rangers.236 “[O]nce reserved as the last option to defuse a 
dangerous situation,” these units are now routinely called forth, by 
state and local governments, to “enforce laws against consensual 
crimes.”237 Thus, it appears today’s police paramilitary units bear a 
strong resemblance to the nineteenth century militia. A recent New 
York Times exposé captures the similarities: 
Police SWAT teams are now deployed tens of thousands of times 
each year, increasingly for routine jobs. Masked, heavily armed 
police officers in Louisiana raided a nightclub in 2006 as part of 
a liquor inspection. In Florida in 2010, officers in SWAT gear and 
with guns drawn carried out raids on barbershops that mostly led 
only to charges of “barbering without a license.”238 
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3. Soldiers, State Actors, and Quartering 
These two considerations—the nineteenth century “police-ization” 
of the military and the vastly different roles of police officers throughout 
American history—suggest that the Third Amendment, as applied to 
the states, ought to bind state actors beyond the National Guard. 
Perhaps the Third Amendment should govern all state and local actors 
the way the First Amendment does, notwithstanding explicit 
constitutional language that, based on the text alone, only binds Con-
gress.239 
At the very least, the Third Amendment ought to cover police 
paramilitary organizations like SWAT. The similarities between SWAT 
and state militias of the nineteenth century are striking, at least in 
terms of function. The only principled distinction between the two is 
federalism. That is, the familiar argument that the Third Amendment 
is among those Bill of Rights provisions whose core is federal 
restraint.240 Nonetheless, McDonald, and the line of incorporation cases 
preceding it, evinces a deliberate pattern by the Supreme Court of 
incorporating all of the Bill of Rights Amendments against the states.241 
After all, it seems an implicit basis behind the very idea of incorporation 
is, if the right at issue were important enough to be included in the Bill 
of Rights, it is presumptively fundamental. So, unless the Court 
reverses course and finds the Third Amendment to be a mere federalism 
provision, this argument must fail. 
While most of the discussion thus far has focused on the word 
“soldier,” the Third Amendment contains another word that is perhaps 
even more limiting—quarter. While the fact pattern in Mitchell v. City 
of Henderson seemingly lends itself to straightforward application of 
the “quartering” question, the court never reached that inquiry after 
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finding that police are not “soldiers” under the Third Amendment.242 
Normally, when police occupy a private citizen’s home without the 
person’s consent, it takes place when the home, or someone or 
something within the home, is the target of investigation. Under those 
circumstances, the Fourth Amendment analysis is triggered. In 
Mitchell, however, the police used the family’s home to aid in their 
investigation of the Mitchell family’s neighbor. That the nine-hour 
intrusion appears to be more akin to an occupation, rather than a search 
or seizure, suggests that there is potential overlap between the Third 
and Fourth Amendments, at least under that fact pattern.243  
The Fourth Amendment, too, has its limits in this domain. That 
is, there are cases in which the Fourth Amendment fails to protect 
individuals in their homes notwithstanding police officials doing things 
that could reasonably fall within a definition of quartering. In Segura 
v. United States,244 law enforcement officers remained in a suspect’s 
apartment for nineteen hours without a warrant and after the defendant 
had been removed off-site.245 The officer remained in the suspect’s place 
from 11pm until 6pm the next day when a magistrate issued a search 
warrant.246 Referring to the event as an “occupation,” the court found 
that the seizure of the apartment was reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.247 Were the Third Amendment to apply to the police, the 
Segura court would have had to grapple with the Amendment’s 
absolute prohibition on quartering during peacetime, rather than the 
“reasonableness” requirement in the Fourth Amendment.  
Or consider a case in which a valid search warrant was authorized. 
In Lykken v. Brady,248 police obtained a search warrant to search the 
plaintiff’s property related to a stale murder investigation from decades 
earlier.249 The search lasted four days, during which the plaintiff was 
not allowed to re-enter the interior of her farm to feed her livestock, 
care for her newborn kittens, or even to turn off the stove.250 The search 
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turned up no evidence, and the district court conceded the methods 
were unreasonable.251 Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit concluded that 
the search complied with the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness 
requirement, because “brief detention was not [an] unreasonable 
intrusion on Fourth Amendment rights.”252  
While it is unclear how these cases could have been resolved on 
Third Amendment grounds, they do illustrate the limitations of the 
Fourth Amendment in the context of alleged police occupations.  
Thus, future Third Amendment litigants, like the Mitchell family, 
ought to persist in seeking a judicial determination that “soldier,” as 
used in the Third Amendment, binds state and local law enforcement. 
Once a court makes this finding, the task will be to determine where 
the Third and Fourth Amendments overlap and whether that alters the 
available remedies. To be sure, the Fourth Amendment, by its text, is 
significantly more far-reaching than that of the Third.253 Nonetheless, 
the existence of occurences, like those detailed in Mitchell, Segura, and 
Lykken, suggests potential overlap, even if only in unusual cases. 
Further, a judicial determination that the Third Amendment binds 
state and local law enforcement must be aimed at eventually bypassing 
the governmental defense of qualified immunity. As discussed, the 
Engblom court allowed a facially meritorious Third Amendment claim 
to proceed to trial, only to later be dismissed because the law was not 
“clearly established.”254 This is why it is so critical for litigants to persist 
in their efforts to allege Third Amendment violations in the concededly 
rare circumstance of police occupations of civilian homes. That is to 
say, future victims of such occupations should seek to get a fresh Third 
Amendment interpretation clearly established.  
 
251. Id. 
252. Id. at 926. 
253. For example, the Fourth Amendment does not specify a governmental actor 
against whom the right applies. We only know that the right “shall not be 
violated” by government actors. Thus, the right has been interpreted to not 
only apply against police, but to apply to other state actors like public school 
officials. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 359 (1985). The Third 
Amendment, on the other hand, can only be violated by “soldiers.” Further, 
the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable “searches and 
seizures.” The elasticity of those terms has evolved over time to include not 
only physical searches, but even to include analysis of urine samples. Skinner 
v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989) (finding that 
the “collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy” 
and constitutes “searches” under the Fourth Amendment). Also, the right 
applies to “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” The Third, on the other 
hand, only protects persons in their “houses.” 
254. Engblom v. Carey, 572 F. Supp. 44, 46 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 1983). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 2·2016 
The Third Amendment Incorporated 
576 
Conclusion 
In this Note, I examine a unique way of bypassing the limitations 
inherent in the word “soldier,” as used in the Third Amendment. I 
advocate for using the incorporation doctrine, which, by its nature, can 
yield novel—and perhaps even manipulated—interpretations of 
protections in the Bill of Rights. Given incorporation doctrine’s em-
phasis on American history in the lead-up to the passage of the Four-
teenth Amendment, I argue that it is likely that the Framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment would have understood today’s municipal po-
lice, and particularly police paramilitary units, as falling within the 
definition of “soldier.” This is because, during the course of the nine-
teenth century, the federal government, as well as state governments, 
understood soldiers as fulfilling domestic law enforcement duties, just 
as police do today. Just as the Second Amendment is now an individual 
right unconnected to service in the militia, the Third Amendment could 
be interpreted as conferring an individual right against all forms of 
governmental intrusion in the home, independent of military-related 
contexts.  
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